Abstract. In this article, we focus on the Balanced Scorecard (BSC) as
clearcut (cf. Townley, 1995; Kallinikos, 1996; Meyer, 1986 Meyer, , 1994 Bloomfield and Vurdubakis, 1997) . The present article is intended as a rejoinder to the type of accounting research that investigates the role of accounting in the organizing process. It sets out to investigate a management accounting model-and emerging accounting practice-that has hitherto received little or no attention in critical research, namely the 'Balanced Scorecard' (BSC). Kaplan and Norton (1992 , 1993 , 1996a , 1996b presented this model as an alternative form of management accounting, which is now being used by major American firms as well as by firms in the present authors' native country, Sweden.
Management accounting as a mode of instrumental action is caught between two ambitions that are not easily reconciled. The ambition to project a true image of what takes place in an organization is paired with accounting as a practice of intervention-of influencing and shaping action and sometimes literally creating new worlds. Accounting as a project of revealing hitherto unknown facts relies on naturalizing the creation of power-knowledge relations as innocent acts of revelationi.e. 'finding' new costs or assets. The instrumental orientation, on the other hand, can hardly be criticized for epistemological naivety as it aims openly to construct selective schemes for cybernetic control purposes (cf. Anthony and Govindarjan, 1995) . Single-loop, cybernetic accounting models have never been founded upon any claim to mirror business reality in all its vast complexity. The lack of reflexivity lies rather in the assumption that accounting is a tool in its masters' hands. This conflict becomes apparent when the epistemology underpinning the BSC is scrutinized. Kaplan and Norton have a vision, true to the spirit of the enlightenment, of expanding the knowledge of business processes. Our analysis, on the other hand, attempts to de-naturalize this epistemology of control in general, and of the BSC in particular. We ask how the model works as a framing device, or intellectual technology, as it constitutes and orders reality rather than reveals what is unknown. The BSC differs from classical management accounting models in its real effects, not in its truth-value. Compared to, for instance, return on investment (ROI) (Swieringa and Weick, 1987) , the BSC is also a selective ordering device and a powerful action trigger, but also more comprehensive as it assigns more activities to the realm of management accounting.
The article begins with a presentation and analysis of BSC with particular reference to the conditions of knowledge and intervention in management accounting. Accounting knowledge in general, and the BSC in particular, is a mode of intervening and reshaping the social by means of dividing practices (Kallinikos, 1996 , Yakhlef, 1998 . These practices are important instances of organizing, as they create new knowledge. Accounting produces a particular brand of reality in society and organizations-it is a way of 'world-making' (Goodman, 1978) . We then examine two cases in which the BSC has been introduced in firms. We use our empirical material to extend and develop our initial critique. The Organization 9(2) Articles first case illustrates BSC as a framing device for instrumental thinking. A dividing and directing scheme, which becomes naturalized as a compensation for the alleged shortcomings of human cognition, replaces everyday reflection. In presenting the second case, we offer an analysis of how the BSC operates simultaneously as a strait-jacket on strategic intentions, and as a constituent of new patterns of action, but loosely coupled to the strategic intentions it was intended to fulfil. The cases are based on 23 tape-recorded and transcribed interviews with managers from all levels. A considerable volume of written documents on corporate strategies in company B and the manuals of the 'Scorecard' in use in both companies were also analysed.
Conditions of Knowledge in Management Accounting
The development of management accounting is often seen as a development of various models and techniques, more or less reflecting changing business conditions and the aims of owners and managers (Otley, 1994) . The critique arising from this technocratic approach is concerned with the capacity of management accounting as a tool for facilitating business success. Established and new practices are scrutinized and subjected to questions such as: are crucial internal or external factors excluded from calculation? Does the design of control systems promote important aims? Or do they in the long run actually promote an inefficient allocation of resources? This brand of technocratic critique has developed into several sub-fields of knowledge appearing in academic publications and is expressed in the development of new models in management accounting (Roslender, 1996) .
During the 1980s, this particular domain of accounting knowledge began to appear in the American debate on national and industrial competitiveness. In a book that was to shape the future of this domain, Johnson and Kaplan (1987) delivered a devastating critique of the effects of management accounting in American industry. As some critics have noted, the argument shows a noticeable flair for invoking a sense of 'paradise lost' (Ezzamel et al., 1990) . A great range of effects is enumerated, from dysfunctional short sightedness to the distraction of attention away from the core of industrial enterprise and towards financial concerns. Many of the conclusions concerning the history of American industrial development are dubious-for instance, the authors disregard the growing influence of institutional investors-but this is not the main point we want to make here. Johnson and Kaplan's book produced real effects, some involving the authors themselves. After publishing their analysis, the authors began actively promoting two different approaches to the renewal of accounting. Johnson (1994) has promoted models of accounting that make the shop-floor level of activities in firms the centre of attention and measurement. Together with the business consultant David Norton, Kaplan developed a more grandiose
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response to the shortcomings of traditional management accounting. In a book, Kaplan and Norton (1996b) summarized their previous articles (1992, 1993, 1996a) and presented a new model for management accounting-the Balanced Scorecard.
The development of the BSC provides an opportunity for investigating some unusually explicit reflections on the conditions of knowledge and intervention from inside the domain of management accounting. Kaplan and Norton claim to take the major fallacy of management accounting head on-its inability to uncover what really takes place in firms. Their approach is classical rationalism: in order to attain satisfactory results it is necessary to acquire true knowledge of businesses processes, with a capital T and a capital K. The conventional distinction between the world of representations and the object world, which has been acknowledged from post-positivism onwards, doesn't burden their analysis (Bernstein, 1983; Hacking, 1999; Rorty, 1989) . Kaplan and Norton consider knowledge as an organizational resource to unravel in order to manage it and make it productive (Nonaka 1994) . That is why they assign a new and expanded role to accounting-to cover a broader spectrum of activities and, most importantly, to map the causal relations across different activities.
In order to attain that, they present a model where financial accounting is placed together with three other focuses-aspects of business activities to be measured and evaluated in a systematic way. Financial measures are assigned just as much importance as before, but Kaplan and Norton insist that they must be related to the performance drivers-what actually creates the financial results. The three focuses or perspectives-of learning and development, market/customer and the internal business processes-will make it possible to monitor not only past performance but also what is happening in the present, in order to control and predict future outcomes (1996b: 8) . The first step towards increasing knowledge is by extending measurement to new activities and dimensions. A new time horizon is established by measuring activities presumed to affect future business; this is the learning and growth perspective. Resources that are not formally controlled by the firm are also measured; this is the customer perspective. The present value for customers of what is done today is measured as value-creating internal processes; this is the internal business process perspective. Within each perspective, two critical success factors are to be measured; i.e. the customers are not to be measured at large but with respect to two critical factors. When the three 'new' perspectives are presented in more detail together with the financial perspective, a well-known blend of classical and modern managerial practices appears, such as measuring employee satisfaction, mapping value chains and product portfolio analysis.
The second step towards increasing knowledge is by continuously testing and evaluating the causal relations between the four perspectives of control. The validity of each success factor as a driver of financial Organization 9(2) Articles results should be evaluated. Selection is to proceed from an imperfect but improving knowledge of causal relations. In the long run, (double-loop) learning will improve and make ever more successful applications of this new brand of management accounting possible. But their rationalist approach is not merely about 'to know' in a passive sense. The purpose of knowledge in accounting is to inform intervention or, in Kaplan and Norton's terms, to 'implement strategies'. The model is presented as far more than a bundle of practices: it is intended to be a tool for implementing corporate and business unit strategies on the one hand and for acquiring true knowledge of the cause and effects of business activities on the other. Together, these two aspects, which are closely related, are intended to promote double-loop learning: strategy formulation should be informed by scientific knowledge of the relevant performance drivers, while the execution of strategies should be a test of management knowledge and a means of improving it (Kaplan and Norton, 1996b: 10) . Strategies are to be implemented by setting goals for the critical success factors within each perspective. By establishing goals for the drivers of business success, and with control systems monitoring them, strategies will be implemented.
Kaplan and Norton's proposed mode is thus relevant to analyse not only because of its achieved status as a serious and interesting alternative to traditional management accounting. It is also an unusually explicit exposé of a combination of two constituting ideas in the field of accounting knowledge and practice-the desire to gain true knowledge and the plight to govern by numbers. We will place accounting in a wider frame and approach it both as a worldview and as a technique. Accounting practices, such as written reports, pictures, numbers, charts, statistics, etc., are performative and important instances of organizing, as they create new domains of power/knowledge at the same time as they provide the means for acting upon what is constructed (Kallinikos, 1996; Power, 1997) . This performative aspect can be captured by the broad term 'intellectual technology':
. . . techniques of notation, computation and calculation; procedures of examination and assessment . . . the standardization of systems for training and the inculcation of habits; the inauguration of professional specialisms and vocabularies; building design and architectural forms. (Miller and Rose, 1990: 8) The distinctive character of formal organizations relative to other social settings is their ability to produce predictable and continuous results, manufactured by instrumental thinking and action (Kallinikos, 1996) . Instrumentality is paradoxically even more of a social construction than everyday life, as it is the outcome of an intricate combination of man's imagination and ability to construct conceptual and practical tools. The conventional characteristics of work organizations, such as roles, rules, standardized patterns of action and systems of control, are examples of The Balanced Scorecard as an Intellectual Technology Mats Edenius and Hans Hasselbladh such selective objectification of relations and processes. The skeleton of formal organizing is thus always that something is arranged, according to a very selective, functional point of view. Formal organizing, however, is not to be mistaken for the 'machine' metaphor come true (Morgan, 1986) , since emotions, informal communication and unplanned processes loom large in contexts of working life. But the frames of meaning and the daily work of engineers, doctors or hotel receptionists (to take some examples) are embedded in selective representations. Instrumental thinking, with utility, functionality and the ability 'to know in advance' 2 as its prerogatives, is a description not of formal organizing itself but of its central defining scheme that is never brought to a lasting, covering closure (Kallinikos, 1996: Ch. 5 ). The orientating schemes and techniques of formal organizing were previously treated as a black box-as readymade structures to measure and compare (Pugh et al., 1969) . But, lately their status as technologies for constructing an organized world has increasingly come to the fore (Bloomfield, 1995; Bloomfield and Vurdubakis, 1997; Chia, 1998; Hoskin and Macve, 1986; Miller and O'Leary, 1987; Cooper, 1992; Kallinikos, 1992 Kallinikos, , 1996 . What makes action, in the identical and predictable ways of formal organizations, possible?
This question has led to a number of redirections in organizational analysis. The role of very particular and selective instances of communication and intervention in the organizing process has come to the fore, rather than language itself and its metaphors, troops and metonyms, as proposed in the symbolic turn in social science. Instead, and more in line with the work of Foucault (1980) , attention has been turned towards expert and professional language and codes, codified systems of representation, and prosaic and seemingly neutral devices for inscriptions. This is aligned with the mode of knowledge in accounting-expert languages transformed to systems by means of inscriptions and formal systems, operating as practices on a regular basis. Writing, documenting, theorizing and researching become themselves processes of knowing. Other modes of knowledge (tacit or cultural) are not totally subsumed by knowledge based on formal systems, but become adjoined to premises and procedures less attuned to them. Individual and collective cognition becomes more orientated towards second-order operationsrepresentations rather than a stream of undifferentiated experiences (Zuboff, 1988) . Cognition and representation differ, as the former is a situated activity, orientated towards whatever is present and within reach of the eye, while representation makes things, people and events present in an abbreviated form (Cooper, 1992) . Screening financial results, for instance, is not an example of natural selectivity like recognizing a friend among strangers, since it is mediated by techniques of intervention that define and delimit objects of knowledge and action. If action and knowledge are framed and to some extent defined by codification and formal systems, agency and interaction in formal organizations will differ from the image of interacting men in flesh and blood. Interaction in such Organization 9(2) Articles circumstances cannot be regarded merely as occurring between present, natural agents, since agents, objects and events in formal organizations enter the social sphere by practices of representation (cf. Giddens, 1990) .
The aim of the present article, departing from the approaches discussed above, is to investigate and problematize the BSC as an intellectual technology. Accounting is seen as an instance of world-making undertaken to institute knowable and controllable worlds, as a process of 'world-making' (Goodman, 1978; Kallinikos, 1996) . The persistent probing into what is real and what is not (cf. Bernstein, 1983) becomes less relevant as the ontological commitment shifts to a becoming-realism instead of the more conventional being-realism, or any of its parasitic contradictions, such as nihilism or relativism (Chia, 1996 (Chia, , 1998 . Our empirical analysis is not concerned with the question of whether or not the model was a success, nor how difficult it was to implement. We have concentrated on exploring what the BSC model produces, when it is practised. As noted above, it is not real or unreal but it may partake in the becoming of social and institutional reality (Searle, 1995) . Kaplan and Norton's presentation of the BSC will thus be regarded here as an intrinsic part of the model, as an act of signification that attempts to constitute a certain understanding of the practices of which BSC is composed.
Making up for the Limits of Cognition
The BSC in action creates users who search for information and who believe themselves to have captured it, thus naturalizing the process of representing. It seems to inhibit exploration and creativity, since the inadequacy of man's cognitive capabilities is repeatedly invoked and accepted. The image of the company made up by the four perspectives of the BSC is understood as more embracing than the previous one from accounting figures. But the image is also defined as more reliable than established, socially embedded notions of the firm, as it is manageable. In this section, we discuss the appeal that BSC seems to have to managers by reference to our first case, Company A.
Company A is a big general clothing agent with a little over a hundred shops and around 2000 employees in Sweden, Norway and Finland. Following a sharp decline in profitability in 1995, a new CEO was appointed. He immediately started to implement BSC together with a pronounced 'target' type of management. At the time of the study, BSC was fully implemented and had a prominent place in speech as well as action in the control process, which has allowed us to highlight some aspects of the model-in-use that are more than simply 'starting-up phenomena'. In this first case, we will analyse how the use of BSC shapes the conditions under which it becomes possible to know what to manage and how things in the company connect to each other.
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As we have noted before, Kaplan and Norton propose that BSC could be used as a tool for implementing corporate strategies and gaining true knowledge about the causes and effects of business activities. But BSC, as all formal systems of control, is a vehicle for objectifying different entities in the organizing process, rendering them amenable to management. The things that are captured in the BSC scheme can be regarded as selective, framed snapshots, caught in the course of taming the (by nature) unruly organizing process. How is this embodied and realized in the practices of the BSC? We will first show how the BSC, in a subtle way, raises question marks about man's cognitive capacity. Let us listen to three respondents:
Our goal in the beginning was to have three or four success factors connected with each perspective. But after a while we realized that it was more reasonable to have two factors connected with each perspective. There will be too many goals to keep in order if, for example, we have four success factors connected to each perspective, because there will be 16 all together [4 ϫ 4 that are to be measured and followed up], and that is more than we can manage. (Planner)
We must start to concentrate ourselves and prioritize the goals that the management thinks are important. We must concentrate on some of the bits one by one; we must not spread ourselves too widely. For example, process and just-in-time are very important right now. (Purchaser) We sat and talked a whole day and one thing after the other turned up and we combined different words. Sometimes you could use different words for similar things; sometimes when we put the words together we could pick out the most important ones, what should be kept and what we should get rid of. When we had worked for a while we had limited ourselves to half an A-4 page, where the most important details were written down. We forced ourselves through that, to make us think about goals. (Purchaser) In almost all of the interviews, the subjects stressed their own cognitive limitations when it came to handling large numbers of key success factors. Our respondents thought there was a risk that the key success factors would become too many. Their number would have to be restricted otherwise the technology would not work. What is being represented is a limited picture of 'reality'. But, this limited picture must be as solid as possible and encapsulate the right and most important things. The intention is 'to catch the essentials' and to manage them. People who use BSC are supposed to set priorities among a multitude of events, to choose in advance the factors that will lead to success. But both the perspectives and the key success factors emerge from a representational process that breaks with proportionality, 3 but in which the objects created are perpetual reminders of the manager's inadequacy. 4 Every single manager's cognitive capacity comes to be seen as a problem, as a basic impediment to forming a correct view or understanding of what is going on in the firm. The individual's potential capacity to manage wholeness is displaced by the intellectual technology; embedded knowlOrganization 9(2) Articles edge is reorganized into ensembles of inscriptions in a variety of report systems. The respondents relate BSC to a certain kind of cognitive performance, which is defined as 'keeping many goals in order' or, more informally, 'keeping many balls (perspectives, key success factors, etc.) in the air'. A number of key figures are accepted as 'wholeness'. Double-loop learning assumes another meaning, namely to teach individuals to act from (enact) their limitations. BSC as a technology seems to rely on the users' perception of their limitations, as much as its capacity to provide 'true' knowledge of the cause-effects aspect of business activities.
But it is important to remember that this perceived incapability is also a product of a long historical development. In other times and circumstances, people are less inclined to be concerned with their ability to deal with many things at the same time. In football or hunting in a team, people are able to interpret and act very swiftly in complex surroundings. But, when we face codified knowledge, in figures, scores and graphics, the limits well known from research in cognitive psychology appear (cf. Sterman, 1994) . Formal organizations can't be made to resemble a hunting band, but, when more activities are known basically through codified knowledge and formal systems, these limitations will be felt more often. To naturalize these limitations and gloss over their connection to a very particular mode of knowing also transforms the cause to a remedy.
The BSC constitutes to know as something that by necessity must rely on codified knowledge and formal systems. But it also shapes what is considered as relevant to know, by appealing to the shortcomings of management accounting. Its one-dimensional selectivity is replaced by what we call a 'selective holism'-the four combined perspectives that can encapsulate everything a manager needs to know. In Kaplan and Norton's (1993: 134) own words:
The scorecard presents managers with four different perspectives from which to choose measures . . . BSC . . . provides executives with a comprehensive framework that translates a company's strategic objectives into a coherent set of performance measures.
By requiring managers to select a limited number of indicators within a few perspectives, the Scorecard is supposed to help managers to focus on a strategic vision. A picture is constructed by representing a few selective aspects of the world to know. Although the authors say that the four perspectives should not be considered as a 'strait-jacket', they stress that 'the four perspectives have been found to be robust across a number of industries' (Kaplan and Norton, 1996b: 34) .
The respondents attest to the perceived relevance of the four perspectives as summarizing their view of what it means to manage an organization. Some examples:
I regard the scheme as satisfied customers giving us a good turnover [financial perspective], which in turn gives the company good profits. So, customers must be put in one perspective; and there are two more which The Balanced Scorecard as an Intellectual Technology Mats Edenius and Hans Hasselbladh are about internal efficiency, and a fourth one about innovation and learning. I think we all need these four perspectives, i.e. internal efficiency, customers, learning and growth, to get good turnover. (Project leader)
It became very clear that we did not have the right instrument to measure, to measure important things. This became apparent when we began to use the BSC. We started customer investigations and internal climate investigations, and it soon became obvious what we were good or bad at. In our case we lack the competence for measuring. We found that we organized too many projects and that we had to limit the numbers. A vast literature has emphasized the influence of frames in such fields as cognition and decision-making (e.g. Argyris et al., 1985; Goffman, 1974; Dunbar et al., 1996) . The main idea is that, to control or handle a situation, a focus of interest must be defined, i.e. a frame. But, following Bateson (1973) , regarding the frame as an instruction to the observer to attend to what is within while suppressing what is outside, we assign a more active role to the frame concept in the organizing process. We conclude that the four perspectives are framed by the BSC model in a manner that represents them as natural, solid and obvious (to the project leader quoted above, for instance). This effect also generates the perceived relevance of the BSC scheme to its users, shaping individual and collective cognition in a very particular way. The structure of BSC seems to communicate an understanding that things do affect each other. This objectifying and meaning-ascribing effect arises from a process of pendulum moves between selectivity and artificial holism. The framing effect of the model makes the particular choices of perspectives less relevant. Let us, therefore, examine the way the key figures are generated and placed in different perspectives.
In the process of using the BSC, the numbers of perspectives or key figures were negotiated in this case. In Company A, there was a discussion about whether to have five perspectives instead of the four main ones in the BSC scheme. This means that the company has followed Kaplan and Norton's advice not to regard the four perspectives as a straitjacket:
We wondered about having a human perspective as well, but we decided not to let the human perspective become a hostage, a place for taking care of personnel questions. Our opinion is that the responsibility for the staff is Organization 9(2) Articles catered for by the fact that we have a staff function, we've moved that far and we shouldn't build that into the card as some sort of alibi, like 'here we take care of questions like this'. That is why management is included in the internal process perspective, and it is a high-priority factor. I don't think it's important what we call the different perspectives, it's more important to capture all the critical success factors. To cover these in the card is more important than what you call them. Questions about human factors are obvious and clear in our scorecard. (Project manager)
This person tells us that personnel questions should be regarded in a wider context, and should thus be implemented in the BSC scheme. Instead of starting from different perspectives from which to choose measures, she departed from a choice of critical success factors. After a couple of years of using the BSC, the company decided to implement a fifth perspective:
In the beginning we thought a lot about whether we should start with Kaplan and Norton's predefined perspectives; we were keen not to follow them, because it is just a model. But after a while we accepted Kaplan and Norton's four perspectives. What we discussed was whether we should let a personnel perspective be included or not. What became the conclusive argument was that we did not like to see our staff as something separate from our ordinary business. We chose to regard them as implicit in the internal efficiency perspective, or as part of the customer perspective . . . Yes, we took another decision after a while, but the thing was, there is no right or wrong way in this; but we wanted to highlight the staff perspective, and that was not the case when it belonged to everything else. (Planner) We have now increased our perspectives from four to five and it is due to this that I think 'daring' is important [referring to a key figure in the internal process perspective] and we must have the capacity to distinguish between staff and innovations, to put this perspective into focus. Because, in this case, we didn't have to mix personnel issues with questions of innovation. (Marketing manager)
The project manager (in the first of these three quotations) regards personnel issues as important enough to warrant inclusion in the (original) BSC. In the second case (the second two interviews above), the logic is: we have an extraordinary technology, let us use the model and add another perspective. What happened in the second case was that personnel questions were separated from the other perspectives, thus introducing a definition of a new 'object' and the measurement practices related to it. In the BSC scheme, it was possible either to include or exclude personnel. In both cases, new knowledge was generated about the staff and their activities. Our conclusion is that the four selected perspectives are not as important as Kaplan and Norton say they are. Their alleged robustness is not a result of their content per se. But, if the number of perspectives and their content don't have a key role in the organizing process around the BSC, are they important in some other way?
The creation of perspectives and objects for measurement provides the basis for defining an area of intervention and control (which makes [ac-]counting, comparison, inspection, etc. possible) . It provides a mechanism for constituting reality as something that is amenable to certain kinds of action. Our respondents create objects, i.e. perspectives and key figures, thereby opening the way for a successive creation of identities and differences. The respondents in both our cases define the conditions under which it is possible to 'know things' and to identify what is connected with what, to decide for instance if the captured object is about human capital or some other key figure. They develop an order by means of a taxonomy (the perspectives) each further specified in a mathesis (the critical success factors) (Townley, 1995) . Defining and acting on the perspectives and the key figures stops the flux of the world by representing it in a fixed form. The power of BSC resides in a potential to frame at the same time as it provides a sense of wholeness and unity.
The perspectives already defined, which are said by Kaplan and Norton to be robust across a number of industries, are not guaranteed to invoke a sense of wholeness and objectivity. The perceived robustness appears when BSC is practised as a framing technology. It combines the basic scheme of instrumentality-selective intervention-with an artificial holism achieved by recombining highly selective representations. The perceived stability or robustness emerges when different modes of representing and intervening are combined in an orchestrated effort to construct and connect new objects for measurement. Any established mode of instrumental thinking and doing in business could be put to use as a critical success factor in the BSC. The framed practices are regarded as important in themselves, when the Scorecard is understood as a tool for implementing corporate strategy. If one perspective fails as taxonomy, a new perspective could be imported to provide a new possibility for measuring and comparing.
If we regard the organizing process from this angle, the number of perspectives is less important, it is more a question of constructing perspectives that enable instrumental thinking and action. Holism is manufactured by a limited but not exact number of perspectives and key figures. BSC as an intellectual technology makes the connecting of a broad range of different domains appear solid and obvious. In this sense, the model works for its own success. We can imagine a BSC with only three or maybe six broadly defined perspectives, and then ask people to add what they find to be the most important drivers for getting a good job done, and the result would probably be the same.
This example also tells us something about the 'Balance' in the Scorecard. 'Balance' seems to have no deeper meaning than the connection of a wide range of key success factors from areas not systematically measured and evaluated prior to the Scorecard's appearance.
5 BSC is only a mixture of broken proportionalities, whereby different measuring practices are forged into a packet. The BSC is not a unique technology as regards framing and excluding per se, but rather in the way these practices are hyperbolized.
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Strategic Visions and Procrustev's Bed
Our second case, Company B, is a research and product-development operation within a large Swedish firm in the telecom business, X-Com. It is the result of a merger between two previously separate subsidiaries, one specializing in hardware and the other in software development. It has around 1500 employees in several Swedish cities. The organization is divided between market areas responsible for projects ordered by other units in X-Com, and competence areas that provide personnel for the projects. At the time of our study in 1999, the new CEO of Company B had formulated a broad set of ideas about the direction of change over the next few years, tying up with the strategic reorientation of the corporation as a whole. As a result of the standardization of IT and telecommunication subsystems, the role of the company as an internal provider in X-Com should change towards providing knowledge and products of a less substitutable kind and working closer to the internal customers. The general strategic redirection was broadly accepted among the managers; in fact it was even proactively endorsed as sensible and necessary. Apart from that, there was also a corporate-wide redefinition of X-Com as belonging to the international telecom business. A more general shift, concerning the points of reference for what is held as true and what are regarded as the necessary characteristics of a firm, seems to have been part and parcel of this process. The company is presented as belonging to an international sphere of high-tech companies, an image that is corroborated by the use of concepts, causal models and practices drawn from that field.
Company B will be exploited to show how the BSC can be put to work in a business context. At the time of our study, the BSC had been materialized into administrative routines, reports and scheduled management activities. It had become a number of local practices, producing knowledge about new objects. First, the relation between BSC and the new corporate strategy will be discussed. Measurement of customer involvement and product and processes renewal was introduced, in order to categorize and evaluate market relationships and technology development, but it proved to be difficult to impose on the complex and interwoven character of high-technology products and processes, or on the multiple levels and dimensions of customer relationships. Following that, we will analyse the activities associated with the measurement of human capital in the consultancy groups in Company B, demonstrating some interesting effects of the BSC.
From around the end of 1997, BSC has enjoyed official status as a technique for planning and evaluating activities in X-Com. It was first suggested as an appropriate model, but from 1998 it became mandatory. All respondents reported that great emphasis is given to financial goals in the management control process in Company B. This applies to all managerial levels and is manifested by the frequency, the amount and the
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perceived importance of financial control. Neither the previous merger nor the introduction of BSC has changed that. But parallel control processes have emerged, related to the extended mode of measurement and control brought about by practising the BSC. They have not replaced or even competed with financial control but with other modes of knowledge, such as experiential or cultural. The different perspectives of BSC have been deployed at various levels in the company and have induced measurements and evaluations and other activities connected with nonfinancial goals. We start by looking at some attempts to implement a strategy by means of the BSC. The BSC became in some sense a 'Procrustean bed' for cutting and stretching of strategy to make the unfit fit. The BSC was brought into play by defining, separating and calculating discrete entities.
As mentioned above, Company B had a new strategic direction at the time of our study. The continuing standardization and increasing compatibility between products and subsystems in the telecom industry was seen as a threat to the role of Company B in X-Com. This general orientation was translated into two specific success factors that were assigned targets and measured within the BSC of Company B. The first was that the proportion of projects that were run in tight collaboration with customers should increase, in order to become more closely connected with end-user markets and to reduce the 'lead times' for development. The second was to initiate a swift major shift in business volume from products in later stages of their life cycles and towards products at earlier stages, measured as a percentage of revenues. Earlier commonsense notions of projects and products had to be redefined and made possible to act on, in terms of counting and evaluating, in order to attain these goals. Projects and products had to that date had no common ground for classification.
Before the introduction of the BSC, Company B's activities had been regarded as parts of various projects ordered and paid for by customers. But projects had now become objects of calculation based on a formal definition of projects by establishing a classification into two broad categories: those that involved the long-term support of existing systems and those in which a new technical core-product was being developed. The two categories were assigned goals related to customer involvement, expressed as a percentage of the projects in each category. Customer involvement in projects was one of two critical success factors in the customer focus of the BSC, the other being delivery performance. The other major classification turned on the notion of products, which also up to now had been a notion of daily, managerial communication. A 2 ϫ 3 dimension served to classify products. First, whether it was a case of product development or support systems, both of which were assigned three different levels of 'novelty'. The six resulting categories of product types were then assigned percentage-related goals. This way of measuring volume at different stages in a 'PLC' (Product Life Cycle, cf. Kotler, 1994) Organization 9(2) Articles was defined as one of two critical success factors in the learning/growth perspective of the BSC, while the second was the measuring of 'process time'. In both cases, very ambitious targets were set in quantitative terms, i.e. the ambition to shift from later to earlier stages of the PLC actually meant an increase of more than 100 percent in revenues from products in the two earliest phases between 1998 and 2000.
By practising the BSC, established notions from marketing, such as 'product', 'customer' and 'PLC', were linked to a very distinctive view of implementing strategies and to the norms of measurability and intervention in management accounting. But, on a conceptual level, Kaplan and Norton had already put forth that in their book. They present a traditional American, managerial blend of comprehensive analysis of the facts at hand followed by a top-down implementation of the strategic direction.
6 Strategies are seen as logical deductions arrived at by using mainstream skeletons of analytical frames for categorizing markets, products, competencies, etc. (Kaplan and Norton, 1996b: 10; 30-2) . The BSC is simply a means for implementing such strategies. This was also what occurred in Company B. The BSC applied in this context turned out to be a homogenizing intellectual technology that facilitated the evaluation of projects and products according to a one-dimensional scale.
To divide and calculate projects and products turned out to be a precarious project, expressing itself in a conflict between the ambition to break through the invisible and un (ac-)countable on the one hand and the outcomes of categorization and calculation on the other:
We didn't know how it was earlier; we had nothing to compare with. There was a lack of clarity in the definition of the parts of BSC. You depart from a general vision of where the company should go, and then very quickly move to what should be measured. And when you start designing the control systems, you bump into all sorts of problems with tools, routines and goals. (Corporate marketing manager) Products in this type of business are made up of various subsystems, which can be combined and reshuffled in a much more complicated manner than the 'ideal type' of the physical, standardized product, the assumption which underpins the mainstream management models that BSC is built upon. Classification became arbitrary, since products are seldom entirely new or old, but rather consist of packages of old but upgraded and adapted subsystems and of other subsystems that are entirely new. It became difficult to perform the kind of basic classifications on which a formal system of performance measurement relies:
We have our own interpretations of how to define projects, but they are not valid in any sense, and it ends up in a lot of judgements. When that happens, you always turn the truth towards what you want. (Corporate senior manager)
The ambition to develop products in closer collaboration with customers is similarly difficult to reduce to a single measure, i.e. what does
customer involvement mean in general and what does it mean in the various business areas of the company? It was stated quite explicitly that it was more important to define different degrees of customer involvement, by whatever means at hand, than to try to map a true picture. One manager considered customer involvement to be so important that it ought to be measured in some way or other, and subjected to continuous monitoring at top management level:
In this organization people sat in the basement and tried to sell products already developed. [But now] we live according to the belief that new products must be developed in very close collaboration with the customers. The principle of customer involvement is self-evident, but how do we measure it? We had to find means to break down the gigantic portfolio of projects. (Senior marketing manager) The use of BSC in this area subjects the development of new competencies and products to a one-dimensional scale of 'newness'. A product is a product is a product, or, translated according to a more popular notion, a business is a business is a business. Corporate strategy becomes a matter of implementing certain given criteria. Unintentionally, the coupling between the classifications applied and the ideas explicated in the strategic intentions becomes rather loose. This could of course be seen as a result of a less mindful application, but it is important to bear in mind that the BSC relies on the use of some given quantitative criteria as a means for implementing strategies. In fact, BSC illustrates vividly that the construction of formal systems of control cannot be guided by the search for 'truth' and not primarily, as our informants also seem to think, because individuals and groups have different priorities. Formal systems require unambiguous definitions of conceptual items, possible to measure in a comparable and consistent way. Strategic visions are not formulated in such terms and to translate them according to such requirements will have its consequences. Representation-as already mentionedalways breaks with proportionality, which is sometimes trivial and expected (as with a town map), but less so if intention is expected to be mediated into action by an unambiguous language.
If the previous example displays how broad and ambitious ideas of reorientating the company were turned into a calculus; the following example shows how a rather delimited idea triggered intense activity on several levels.
How Do We Feel?
We will proceed from strategy to more mundane issues. Following the official move into the organizational field of international high-tech industries, new ideas about the requisites for organizational success were articulated in X-Com. Employee assessments of leadership, working conditions, climate, etc. and other 'soft' aspects of organizations were subsumed under the label 'Human capital' and defined as a cornerstone Organization 9(2) Articles of success in high-tech industries. This reorientation was seen as validated by the 'fact' that successful American firms in that industry score at least 800 on a 1000-scale when their human capital is measured. In this part of our study, the measurement itself was conducted in yearly surveys by one of the largest pollsters in Sweden, according to a broadly applied international model. Each employee fills in a very large survey where they report what they think of their immediate manager (he or she is evaluated in detail), work tasks, communication and information, rewards, etc. The quantitative results are complemented with a qualitative 'culture' study, which is verbally reported to management committees in various parts of X-Com. The results of the survey are distributed to all levels and discussed extensively at meetings and seminars between employees and their managers. Managers at lower levels in Company B have engaged themselves and their groups in activities and programmes aimed at raising the level of the human capital ratio measured in their consultancy groups. The measurement of human capital seems to have had a big impact on the way managers understand their work. The activities related to human capital management actually seem to constitute an important part of the organizing process in the consultancy groups.
Measuring human capital has become a perpetuum mobile of an ongoing problematization and development of personnel management in Company B. The consultancy managers are accountable for supplying the customer projects at the right time with the right number of people possessing adequate competence of the kind required. Corporate management thus regards the development of competence, motivation and leadership as an important issue. It was also well known that failure of managers in this respect would bring its own consequences. Several of the managers interviewed had taken over from previous managers who had not succeeded in raising the human capital ratio of a consultancy group. The notoriously ambiguous and elusive area of workplace relations, motivation and operation management has been recast into a number of themes that are measured yearly and displayed in an index score for each consultancy group. These numbers are evaluated in relation not only to the goal set for the group but also to those of other groups within the same area of competence and these areas are compared to each other across the entire company. Finally, the whole of Company B is encapsulated in one score, an aggregated result for all the market and competence areas, showing a considerable spread from slightly over 500 to nearly 800 on the 1000-scale. Human capital issues have become so important that they now seem to shape the conceptual framework and activities relating to organizing in the consultancy groups in Company B. The BSC measurements have triggered activities such as dialogue, reflexive monitoring and focused efforts to improve working conditions in the consultancy workgroups. But the figures also seem to take on a life of their own. The comparisons within Company B and X-Com, and the
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It is important to score high on human capital. Because then you have high motivation. Is that important? Yes, but don't ask me why. (Consultancy group manager)
There are obvious attempts to 'renegotiate' bad results at the level of the workgroup. Nobody likes to be pointed out as the least successful. The next year's result is usually much better and I'm sure people think about last year's result when they fill in the questionnaire. (Consultancy manager)
But aggregation and comparison sometimes make an odd couple. Comparisons are sometimes made without reference to the different circumstances of the groups; at other times they are taken into account; and sometimes no explicit intergroup comparisons are made at all:
There is no reason why the human capital index should differ between units, really. But, of course, there are reorganizations, and . . . some say that the more employees you have with an academic training, the lower you score. Do you think differences matter, say between 530 and 630 and 730? Yes, you have to take a closer look at such differences. But there is always something happening in the environment, and in the group. (Consultancy manager)
While the notion of human capital is accepted without question, its measures were not explicitly linked to measures in any of the other BSC perspectives. To some extent, this was a result of the way responsibilities had been distributed. The consultancy managers were responsible only for the human capital score and market area managers were responsible only for the market score. But the senior managers who were involved in the control process for Company B as a whole shared a conviction of the importance of the BSC scores and of the connections between them:
Only by reducing the number of goals and connecting them to different aspects of the business can you get an overview. Previously, we had an incomprehensible number of goals and no one had a coherent picture of what was important. (Area manager) Previously, product development was evaluated by accounting figures. This is devastating for a company like ours. Financial results must be seen in a far wider context when they refer to a company like ours, which has a strategic role for X-Com as a whole. (Senior marketing manager)
The belief is strong among managers in company B that BSC is a more holistic approach to control than financial results on their own. But the connection between BSC activities and corporate success seems to rely almost on face value, rather than the scientistic mode of continuous testing that Kaplan and Norton espouse, but we will shortly return to that belief's condition of possibility.
Let us summarize the conclusions that can be drawn from the empirical material in case B. The BSC scheme facilitated explicit definitions of Organization 9(2) Articles projects and products, in order to obtain objects for measurement and control, thus establishing a normalizing closure around certain new areas of calculation. The introduction of the product life cycle (PLC) as a classificatory scheme seems to have broken through a wall of undifferentiated activities and made it possible to position products in a timeframe-past, present and future-as a way of designating what the future business of Company B would be.
7 Once introduced, the BSC became an intellectual technology that separated projects and products from each other, classified them group wise and ranked them according to goals. Projects and products were linked to categories and quantitative measures, in order to frame them within the corporate strategy. Strategy is then understood as a top-down process of implementation and control. But the key figures cannot appear simply by scaling down and miniaturizing different entities as copies of reality. The different key figures-regarded as representations-break with proportionality, 7 which could be one reason why it became difficult to compare different key figures or different goals and strategies with each other. The new practices produced new knowledge, as previous 'everyday' notions were transformed into explicit calculations. But these acts of reframing turned out to be more of a strait-jacket than a vehicle for strategic reorientation or, even less, for learning.
In the second example above, BSC actually shaped practices, as it triggered organizing activities among managers as well as in the workgroups. Human capital measurement provides a way of developing knowledge intertwined with power. Stable, mobile and combinable representations designate a new area of organizational life-the elusive aspects of leadership and climate-to evaluation by top management at a distance. More processes can be 'seen' by everyone, albeit in a very special manner, and it becomes easy to spot whether someone is failing to fulfil their obligations. Everyone's success or failure will be noticed everywhere in the organization. The consultancy manager's position becomes an analytical space (Foucault, 1977; Townley, 1995) for instrumental thinking and action derived from the measurement of the human capital ratio. But common activities and manager-employee activities are justified, designed and connected by reference to means-end calculations in order to raise this ratio. And, as when measures of profitability are compared between profit centres, or any other comparisons are made, there is an interpretative flexibility inherent in the combination of standardized, quantitative measures on the one hand, and on the other a more or less shared background knowledge of circumstances, history and events beyond a manager's control (Munro, 1995) . Up to a point, it is always possible to invoke the unconditional comparison, but also to disregard it or embed it in shared meanings, however transparent the figures may be.
While it is easy to regard the measurement of human capital and market capital as an extension of the homogenizing impact of accounting The Balanced Scorecard as an Intellectual Technology Mats Edenius and Hans Hasselbladh numbers, it remains an open question whether context and social relations are to be kept apart from numbers, or not. It seems more plausible to regard the measurement of human capital as a new domain of semicodified knowledge, which in different ways will shape, and be shaped by, what the measurement was intended to render transparent. Its highly selective and objectifying character defines and delimits an ambiguous aspect of organizational life as something that is right there, something to talk about, measure and act upon.
As one of the focuses in the BSC, the practices of human capital measurement were imbued with importance by management. The measures are not, then, simply figures about leadership and working climate; they also became associated with corporate competitiveness and financial success. The 800-score norm became a crucial factor, as it connects daily activities in the consultancy groups with the X-Com Corporation's move into the international field of high-tech industries. This connection is perceived by the top management respondents as a causal one, as Kaplan and Norton suggest. But no exploration or testing of such a link was manifest. The link was accepted by the logic of good faith, not as something to explore and develop.
The perspectives of BSC and figures-in-use were considered as important. But the figures also tended to assume a life of their own as they became stable and objective, and as the classifications and scores framed and directed action. However, the resulting patterns of action are not systematically or rationally linked to corporate strategy or competition in the telecom industry. The clear-cut classification of projects according to degrees of 'novelty' and the human capital scores seem to be trusted as being at hand to act upon, rather than being products of inquiries into the nature of business causality.
BSC as an Intellectual Technology: Conclusions
The BSC is neither more nor less 'real' than other highly selective forms of representation. In fact, if some of the more penetrating insights offered by Johnson and Kaplan (1987) were brought to bear on the BSC, it could be argued that the epistemological orientation of classical management accounting is simply being extended to frame new domains of action in organizations. Miscellaneous management practices are assembled within a meaning-ascribing frame. The organizing process around BSC is denoted by representation, by rearranging multiplicity through scaling and dividing, and by generating wholeness through selection, creating a glimmer of stability and order. It links practices to each other, not by revealing causal links but by creating a vision of artificial holism. The modus operandi of BSC lies in the perpetual knowledge production by practices connected to key success factors. The different perspectives and the emphasis on measurement generate redefinitions and new patterns of control and self-control. Reframing a practice by the BSC makes new Organization 9(2) Articles truth claims possible, which was particularly evident in the analysis of the measurement of human capital. The actors moved into a new field of relationships where new patterns of action developed, in a self-propelled process of real effects.
Even if Kaplan and Norton's claim to have found a way of understanding the drivers behind business success can be disregarded as such, the BSC can produce certain real effects that partly stem from the rationalist view of knowledge in the model. We have argued that the users ascribe cognitive limitations to themselves, which makes the BSC seem like a natural enhancement of their physical limitations. But this is not sui generis-remember that a coherent mode of questioning management accounting was the genesis of BSC as an alternative mode of accounting. Kaplan and Norton made both the shortcomings of financial accounting and the necessity to extend systematic measurement to other areas the social teleology of BSC. Also, the view among practitioners that accounting is partial and suppressing many other things, for good or bad, is important. Kaplan and Norton claimed to have found a 'quick fix' to bridge what is kept apart by traditional management accounting. The different worlds of business processes and accounting knowledge based on formal systems would no longer need to rely on communication, reflection and judgement as mediating practices.
By reassembling tokens created by intellectual technologies, a world amenable to instrumental intervention is shaped. But knowledge, in the sense of four chosen perspectives or certain chosen key success factors, becomes a competence subjected to a particular class of perspectives to the exclusion of all others. The BSC users are made to act and develop knowledge according to a one-dimensional scale. But, as Lyotard (1984: 18) reminds us, knowledge:
. . . is a question of competence that goes beyond the simple determination and application of the criterion of truth, extending to the determination and application of criteria of efficiency (technical qualification) . . . knowledge is what makes someone capable of forming 'good' denotative utterance, but also 'good' prescriptive and 'good' evaluative utterances . . . it makes good performances in relation to a variety of objects of discourse possible: objects to be known, decided on, evaluated, transformed.
But, practising BSC appears instead not only to increase the ontological insecurity but also to reduce the competence to act.
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1 A broad spectrum of intellectual traditions is represented in accounting studies today. There are postmarxist (Tinker and Neimark, 1987) , interpretive
The Balanced Scorecard as an Intellectual Technology Mats Edenius and Hans Hasselbladh (Boland, 1993) , constructivist (Mouritsen and Munro, 1996) and Foucauldian (Hoskin and Macve, 1986; Miller and O'Leary, 1987) studies. 2 Instrumentalism is tied to intervention by necessity, as instrumental action cannot occur unless objects are made programmable by knowledge and intellectual technologies (Foucault, 1980; Kallinikos, 1996; Miller and Rose, 1990; Miller and O'Leary, 1987) . 3 The key figures as representations have a discriminatory character (cf. Kallinikos, 1996: 17) : Literal duplication or total reconstruction-which is actually a contradiction in terms-is inimical to the very idea and functionality of representation. 4 As Gordon reminds us in the book Power and Knowledge (Foucault 1980: 249):
One property of human norms is that deviation is no longer . . . an adventitious consequence of the imperfection of its construction. Abnormalities come to be understood as effects of a human and social pathogeny which is as natural as the norm itself.
5 As Munro (1998: 225) points out: Accounting-the giving and taking of reasons-is being de-coupled from its traditional 'resources' . . . The three 'new' perspectives in the BSC seem to be directed towards the future, thereby diminishing the past, contrary to the model's claim that it balances different time horizons. 6 The notion of strategy becomes more interesting if it is removed outside the simplistic managerialist triumph-of-the-will tradition. In modern social science, reflexive social action is discussed from different points of view, without any concern for hyper-rationalistic tales from the management field (Giddens, 1984; Foucault, 1980) . There is a vast number of empirical studies of corporate strategy processes that attest to a very different and much more complicated phenomenon than the received view (cf. Morgan, 1991, 1995; Mintzberg and Waters, 1985) . Further, the classical discourses on strategy also depart substantially from today's received wisdom. See, for instance, Clausewitz' (1832 Clausewitz' ( /1982 on the inherent friction and unintended consequences of organized action in war. 7 The PLC is a subtle way of naturalizing the rubbishing of the past (Munro, 1998) .
